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Herding Behavior in the Egyptian Stock Market 
 
Abstract 
This paper tests for the existence of herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market using daily 
and monthly data of listed companies on the Egyptian stock Exchange. We follow the 
methodology of Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) to test for 
the presence of herding behavior in general, during up and down times (times of stress in the 
market), and during bearish and bullish market phases. We also split the sample into pre-
revolution and post-revolution periods to test the effect of 25th January, 2011 revolution on 
herding behavior in the market. We found that: first, the Egyptian stock market exhibits herding 
behavior in general and weak adverse herding in stressful conditions; second, prolonged effects 
of adverse herding exist in up markets only and herding behavior is a short-lived phenomenon; 
third, no evidence of herding behavior during bull and bear markets was noticed; fourth, during 
the pre-revolution period, in pre-post revolution analysis, herding existed in the Egyptian stock 
market in general and weak adverse herding existed during times of market stress as well as 
during bullish market phases, however no evidence of herding behavior during bearish market 
phases was observed; fifth, interestingly, during post-revolution period, adverse herding exists in 
all market states; stressful conditions, in general, and during bullish and bearish phases; and 
finally, after modifying the model for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, no evidence of 
herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market in general for all tested periods was 
recorded. 
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I. Introduction 
Herding behavior in financial markets has been an often observed fact. Herding means that 
investors do not follow rational thinking based on their own evaluation of the market. They 
rather follow other investors’ behavior in buying and selling of stocks. When people herd, they 
tend to suppress their beliefs and follow others. 
On the other hand, when investors refrain from following the market and rationally make 
informed decisions even during stressful conditions, adverse herding is said to occur in the 
market. 
It is assumed that, in normal conditions, investors would have enough time to collect enough 
information, think rationally, analyze the market, and make informed decisions. However, in 
periods of market stress (rising and falling of prices due to extreme market conditions, roomers, 
economic and/ or political disturbances) investors are more biased towards others’ opinions and 
would rather follow other investors’ actions. The fear of huge losses or the thirst for higher than 
average returns would disturb investors’ rational thinking and bias their decisions regarding 
entering and exiting the market (i.e. buying and selling of stocks). This stress would also 
decrease the time for proper information gathering and investors would be more likely to react to 
roomers. Such stress in the market would lead to herding behavior where investors ignore their 
own opinions in favor of others’ views.  
Time is not the only constraint that could lead to herd behavior; other reasons could exist as well. 
Sometimes the information required to make a rational decision may not be available to the 
public. Even if it is available, the quality, reliability, and credibility of the information may well 
present a problem to the investors. Analysts’ forecasts may also be biased due to low self-
confidence or weak forecasting abilities. Finally, portfolio managers’ decision making process 
could also be distorted by their investors’ behaviors and beliefs.  
Normally, there should be variations in stocks’ returns because individual stocks differ in their 
sensitivity to the market and vary in performance. However, in presence of herding behavior, 
individual returns are not likely to deviate much from overall market returns where individual 
investors follow each other’s’ actions and thus individual returns would be close to the market’s 
average return. This is because most of the market is moving in the same direction – either 
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buying or selling – and thus individual stocks’ performance would follow the average 
performance of the market as a whole. 
Herding behavior affects the market because it leads to miss pricing of assets since the decision 
making process is biased and accordingly risk and return determination. 
There are many reasons that could cause herding behavior in financial markets; low trust in 
available information, information blockage, government intervention, weak regulation, 
forecasting difficulties, high market volatility, low disclosure requirements, and less educated 
investors. Thus, herding is assumed to be a characteristic of emerging economies where stock 
markets are expected to be inefficient. 
This paper aims at identifying if herding exists in the Egyptian stock market under normal 
conditions as well as during times of market stress, and tests for Jan 25th revolution effects on 
herd behavior in the Egyptian stock market. 
Egypt has gone through various market states and varying economic and political conditions. 
Egypt is also classified as an emerging economy and thus we find it an interesting market for 
testing for the presence of herding behavior. 
We use daily data of 73 listed companies on the Egyptian stock exchange for the period starting 
Jan 2003 till April 2014 and monthly data of 86 listed companies on the Egyptian stock exchange 
for the period starting Jan 2000 till April 2014. We also use EGX 30 index as proxy for the 
market for both frequencies. To test for the revolution effect, we split the sample into two equal 
data sets. The first set starts Jan 14th, 2008 and ends Jan 24th, 2011 representing the pre-
revolution period; and the second starts Mar 23rd, 2011 and ends Apr 15th, 2014 representing the 
post revolution period. 
Through daily data analysis, we found evidence of weak adverse herding in extreme market 
conditions and evidence of herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market in general. Analyzing 
monthly data, we found that weak adverse herding exists in the up market conditions only, 
however it vanishes at the extreme tails of the distribution. We could not find an evidence for 
herding behavior in the market in general which means that herding behavior is a short-lived 
phenomenon. We also found no evidence of herding behavior in neither bearish nor bullish 
market phases in the Egyptian stock market. Splitting the sample we found that during the pre-
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revolution period, herding behavior existed in general and adverse herding existed during 
stressful conditions as well as during bullish market phases; however, we found no evidence of 
herding behavior during bearish market phases in this period. During post-revolution period, we 
found that adverse herding exists in general, during stressful conditions, and also during bullish 
and bearish market phases. 
When we corrected for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, we found no evidence of herd 
behavior in the Egyptian stock market in general and neither did we in the pre-post revolution 
analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an overview about behavioral 
finance and its relation to the conventional financial theory, and defines herding behavior, its 
types, and possible reasons behind its existence among different market participants. Section III 
gives a brief about the Egyptian stock market, proposed effects of Jan 25th revolution, and how 
Egypt is proposed to be a fertile environment for herding behavior to exist. Section IV addresses 
previous literature about herding in different countries. Sections V and VI explain the data and 
methodology used to test for herding. Sections VII and VIII explain various tests we ran on the 
model and proposed modifications. Section IX explains the results and section X concludes. 
II. Herding and Behavioral Finance 
This section presents an overview of the basic elements of behavioral finance in relation to 
conventional finance theory and their implications, as well as an understanding of the concept of 
herd behavior and its implications for financial market behavior. 
II.1. Behavioral Finance 
Investment behavior of market participants in financial markets is captured by two 
theoretical views: conventional and behavioral finance views. The conventional view of 
finance and financial market behavior rests crucially on the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) (Shleifer, 2000). In an efficient market setting, asset prices always “fully reflect” 
all available information that is relevant for price formation (Lindhe, 2012). Since 
financial assets are considered to be at their fair value, conventional finance argues that 
active traders or portfolio managers cannot produce superior returns over time that beat 
the market. Therefore, investors should just own the “entire market” rather than 
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attempting to “outperform the market.” Investors therefore cannot pursue active 
investment strategies to beat the market index in the long run.  
Three forms of market efficiency are distinguished: a weak, a semi-strong and a strong 
form. The weak form of the EMH assumes that prices reflect all past information. The 
semi-strong form assumes that prices reflect all publicly available information. The 
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis assumes that all relevant private 
information is reflected in prices (Fama, 1970).  
The EMF is based on two assumptions. On one hand, investor behavior in financial 
markets is assumed to be rational. However, even if some investors are not rational, 
prices will not be affected because their trades are random and would cancel each other 
out. On the other hand, if investors are irrational in similar ways, the EMF assumes that 
arbitrageurs will eliminate price discrepancies and restore equilibrium prices.  
The empirical evidence has been inconclusive. In the 1960s and 1970s, empirical 
evidence was consistent with the EMH (Shleifer, 2000). However, since the 1980s, 
empirical findings were not consistent with the conventional efficient market hypothesis. 
A series of “anomalies” were discovered in financial market behavior, which attracted 
considerable research. For example, the efficiency of asset prices was not confirmed by 
the findings of Nicholson (1968) and Basu (1977) who suggested that stocks with high 
price-to-earnings ratios (PE) are overvalued and stocks with low such ratios are 
undervalued (see an overview De Bondt, 2008). Moreover, calendar effects were 
documented (Keim, 1983; Reinganum, 1983), according to which daily abnormal returns 
distributions in January were found to have large means relative to the remaining eleven 
months (January effect). Similar anomalies were documented for a single week date (day 
of the week effect) and other timing intervals. (Lindhe, 2012) 
In response to the observed anomalies, conventional finance models based on the EMH 
were challenged by behavioral finance models. Behavioral finance is a body of 
theoretical propositions and empirical tests that attempt to explain understanding of the 
reasoning patterns of investors and the degree to which these influence the decision-
making process. Essentially, behavioral finance attempts to explain the what, why, and 
how of finance and investing, from a human perspective. This new field has been 
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included in financial analysis from a broader social science viewpoint which includes 
both sociology and psychology. Nowadays, and particularly after the recent international 
financial crisis, behavioral finance is one of the most important research fields and 
challenges on the EMH (Shiller, 2003). 
An earlier challenge on rational individual behavior is prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory deals with the idea that people do not always behave 
rationally. This theory holds that there are persistent biases motivated by psychological 
factors that influence people’s choices under conditions of uncertainty. Prospect theory 
considers preferences as a function of “decision weights”, which do not always match 
with established probabilities. Specifically, prospect theory suggests that decision 
weights tend to overweigh small probabilities and under-weigh moderate and high 
probabilities. When confronted with various options to maximize financial investment 
return, most investors become risk averse when confronted with the expectation of a 
financial gain. 
Behavioral finance analysis rests on two building blocks: the limits to arbitrage and the 
role of psychology (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). These authors argue that real world 
arbitrage involves exposure to risks and costs and accordingly arbitrageurs might not 
interfere to correct a mispricing of an asset in a financial market. This theory contradicts 
sharply the EMH which is built on the foundation of arbitrageurs’ abilities and 
motivation to correct price discrepancies. They also propose that investment decisions 
that cannot be explained or predicted by conventional theories can be better explained by 
psychological studies of investors’ behavior.  
In addition to the numerous studies of market ‘anomalies, in the aftermath of recent 
financial crises (stock market crash of 1997, Asian crisis of 1997, the dot-com bubble of 
2000s, and the financial crisis of 2008), the role of investor psychology in decision-
making has been highlighted as an important influence on financial market behavior (De 
Bondt et al., 2008). Further, the EMH cannot explain many empirical puzzles that exist in 
the financial markets. For example, financial asset prices often demonstrate excessive tail 
volatility, fragility and wave-like behavior. Investors in financial markets exhibit 
unpredictable behavior, with localized and consensus characteristics, which is not 
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necessarily directed by access to and absorption of private information. Thus, the 
assumption of independent decision-making across all investors is not reasonable. 
Instead, investors’ behavior is shown to be interdependent subject to various influences 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996). Behavioral finance suggests that investors’ psychology, 
among other non-economic factors, may offer a possible explanation, which could not be 
offered by the EMH, for the previous stock crashes and empirical puzzles. As a matter of 
fact, nowadays the tendency of individuals to mimic the actions of other’s, i.e. herding, is 
of particular interest (De Bondt et al, 2008) 
II.2. Herding Behavior 
Concerns about overall market efficiency are aroused by the empirical findings that asset 
prices display more volatility than predicted by expected returns or fundamentals (Lux, 
1995). In order to provide an explanation of these observed facts, Christie and Huang 
(1995) argue that the influence of herding behavior in the financial market is a frequently 
used explanation. The existence of herding behavior has become increasingly interesting 
especially in the aftermath of several financial crises. Chari and Kehole (2004) argue that 
financial crises are a result of widespread herding among market participants. Also 
Devenow and Welch (1996) claim that extensive herding behavior is believed economists 
and practitioners to take place among investors in various financial markets. 
To understand herding, one needs to understand investors’ behavior. Various factors 
could affect the decision making process of investors in financial markets: general market 
conditions, investors background and education, surrounding economic and political 
situation, analytical skills, confidence in oneself judgment, fear of making a mistake, 
time, difficulty of a situation, roomers, analyst forecasts, as well as what other investors 
do (mimicking). Investors’ behavior can be affected by others through different channels: 
rumors, statements, observed actions, or observed outcomes of an action (Hirshleifer and 
Teoh, 2003). 
Experimental social psychology gives evidence that most individuals would follow 
decisions made by their group even if they do not fully approve those decisions. In 
financial markets, investors are said to herd when they suppress their personal decisions 
in favor of the collective view of the market even when they do not think that this view is 
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right (Christie and Huang, 1995). In other words, if an investor was planning to make a 
certain investment, but does not invest when s/he becomes aware that other investors are 
not going to make such an investment, the investor exhibits herd behavior, and vice 
versa. Thus, for an investor to herd, s/he must be aware of and influenced by other 
investors’ actions (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). 
The existence of herding behavior refutes the efficient market hypothesis (EMH): that is 
the theory that financial markets are efficient in terms of public availability of 
information and that the current stock prices reflect all the available information 
(Caparrelli, D’Arcangelis and Cassuto, 2004). This is not only because one of the basic 
reasons of herding is the lack of information, but also because herding behavior biases 
the market leading to mispricing of assets. However, not all herding behavior leads to 
market inefficiency. 
There are two types of herding; spurious herding and intentional herding (Caparrelli, 
D’Arcangelis and Cassuto, 2004). Spurious herding occurs when all investors are 
exposed to the same information and thus reach the same decision. Their behavior stems 
from market analysis and personal perspectives. This type of herding is not likely to 
affect the market since actions are a result of informed decisions. Intentional herding, on 
the other hand, is pure imitation of others, regardless of oneself beliefs. It occurs when 
investors act against their own judgment and follow other market participants because 
they doubt their decision making process, they regard other investors as superior, or 
because they seek conformity. This is the type of herding that we are concerned with 
because it is assumed to affect the market. The degree of herding varies depending on 
personal characteristics and context of the situation. 
There are several potential reasons for herd behavior in financial markets. The relevant 
research is growing large. In what follows we shall concentrate on only few important 
reasons which include imperfect information, concern for reputation, and compensation 
structures.  
Avery and Zemsky, (1998) argue that individuals face similar investment decisions under 
uncertainty and have private (but imperfect) information about the correct course of 
action. An investor’s private information may be the result of his research effort. 
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Alternatively, all information relevant to a financial investment can be public but there 
may be uncertainty regarding the quality of this information. Individuals can observe 
each other’s actions but not the private information that each market player receives. 
Even if individuals communicate their private information to each other, the idea that 
“actions speak louder than words” provides justification for this assumption. Only if 
individuals have some view about the appropriate course of action, then inferences about 
a market player’s private information can be made from the actions chosen 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). Herd behavior may arise in this setting. Moreover, 
such behavior is fragile in that it may break easily down following the arrival of some 
new information; and it is idiosyncratic in that random events combined with the choices 
of the first few players determine the type of behavior on which individuals herd. 
Investors who have access to more reliable and credible information are likely to take the 
lead; those who are less informed are more likely to follow these better informed 
investors, a phenomenon that is called “informational cascade” (Zhou and Lai, 2009). It 
is obvious then that first movers determine what other investors do. The decision, 
however, may prove to be wrong for all investors. If this occurs, it is likely that those 
who made the decision first will reverse it, and if the herd follows, this increases the 
volatility of the market. 
As previously mentioned, the information on which first movers based their actions may 
be personally collected or publicly available. The differences lie in individual 
interpretations and confidence in the information. Other investors would not know what 
type of information first movers were exposed to; they only observe their actions, unless 
they have an idea on which course of action is appropriate, in which case they could be 
able to make inferences about the type of information first movers had. 
Herding behavior can be exhibited not only by individual investors, but also by financial 
institutions investing in the market, financial analysts and forecasters, and portfolio 
managers as well. The actions of all of them could bring a bias causing market 
unpredictability and increasing inefficiency.  
13 
 
Shu-Fan Hsieh (2013) suggested that individual herding is rather driven by emotions and 
is likely to disturb the market, but institutional herding is mostly a result of private 
information and it could speed the price adjustment process. 
Financial analysts and forecasters are assumed to herd because of the following: 
➢ Concern for reputation: forecasters could herd in the fear of losing their reputation in 
the market. They could provide recommendations that oppose their personal 
judgments and analysis of the market but in line with other analysts forecasts because 
they fear that if their recommendations turned out to be wrong they risk their 
reputation and credibility. Thus, when forecasters are more concerned with their 
reputation than with providing their accurate beliefs and results, herding occurs. 
➢ Forecast ability: financial analysts and forecasters can also herd if they do not trust 
their analytical and forecasting abilities. When analysts doubt their results, they are 
more likely to herd. 
➢ Perceived credibility of other forecasters: when opposing forecasts and 
recommendations come from credible forecasters, others are more likely to herd. 
➢ Variance of forecasts: when most forecasters agree upon certain recommendations, 
others who deviate from such opinions are likely to herd in order not to stand alone if 
things go wrong. However, when variation increases among forecasters, there is less 
probability of herding behavior to occur. 
Cote and Sanders (1997) argue that herding in financial forecasts is affected by forecast 
ability, reputational concerns, and perceived credibility of other forecasters. However 
they found no conclusive evidence that variations in forecasts affect herding behavior of 
financial analysts and forecasters. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) provide another theory of 
herding based on the reputational concerns of fund managers or analysts. Reputation or 
career concerns arise because of uncertainty about the ability or skill of a particular 
manager. If an investment manager and her employer are uncertain of the manager’s 
ability to pick the right stocks, conformity with other investment professionals preserves 
the uncertainty regarding the ability of the manager to manage the portfolio. This benefits 
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the manager and if other investment professionals are in a similar situation then herding 
occurs. 
Portfolio managers may also exhibit herd behavior when there compensation is linked to 
the portfolio’s performance compared to other investors’ and the market benchmark 
(Maug and Naik, 1996). If this is the case, then the portfolio manager’s choices may very 
well be biased and in most cases this could lead to herding behavior. These authors 
consider a risk-averse investor whose compensation increases with her own performance 
and decreases with the performance of a benchmark or a separate group of investors. 
Both the agent and her benchmark have imperfect, private information about stock 
returns. The benchmark investor makes her investment decisions first and the agent 
chooses her portfolio after observing the benchmark’s actions. Then, the agent has an 
incentive to imitate the benchmark in that her optimal investment portfolio moves closer 
to the benchmark’s portfolio. Furthermore, the fact that her compensation decreases if she 
underperforms the benchmark causes the agent to skew her investments even more 
towards the benchmark’s portfolio than if she were trading on her own account only. 
Herding not only increases asset price volatility but it also makes the overall financial 
system more fragile and subject to substantial destabilization following the occurrence of 
external shocks (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). 
 
III. The Capital Market in Egypt 
Egypt’s stock market is an emerging market which is thought to be inefficient due to the lack of 
sufficient public information, weak market awareness among investors, few financially educated 
market participants, and low liquidity of the market. Further, Egypt’s securities market has 
suffered from the repercussions of the large swings in the business cycle of the Egyptian 
economy and the political turmoil of the recent years. 
III.1. Market Developments 
The Egyptian Exchange (EGX), formerly known as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock 
Exchange (CASE), comprises both Cairo and Alexandria stock exchanges. The first was 
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officially established in 1883, and the latter followed in 1903. In 1909, the issuance of the 
first general regulations for stock exchanges was made.  
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) is the authority responsible for the 
supervision of non-bank financial markets and instruments, including the Capital Market, 
the Derivative Exchange as well as all activities related to Insurance Services, Mortgage 
Finance, Financial Leasing, Factoring, and Securitization.  
The two Exchanges were very active in the 1940’s and Alexandria Stock Exchange was 
ranked the fifth in the World. In 1953, the first law to regulate the market trading after 
1952 revolution was issued. In 1980, The Capital Market Authority (CMA) was 
established.  In 1994, the exchange shifted to an automated order-driven system. In 
October 1996, Misr for Central Clearing, Depository and Registry was established. 
MCDR is a private company which handles the clearing and settlement operations and 
also acts as the Central Depository for all securities in Egypt. The main shareholders of 
MCDR are EGX, banks and member firms. 
The Presidential Decree No. 51 for year 1997 re-defined the legal structure of the 
Exchanges and accordingly both are governed by the same board of directors and share 
the same trading, clearing and settlement systems. Also in the same year, Cairo and 
Alexandria Stock Exchange was added to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Global and Investable Indices. 
In 2001, Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange was included on the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market Free Index (EMF) and EMEA and All 
Country World Index.  
On February 1st, 2003, the Egyptian exchange launched the EGX 30 index to include top 
30 companies in terms of liquidity and activity. The Index is weighted by market 
capitalization and adjusted by free float. It is a good representation the market because it 
is well diversified among different sectors of the economy.  
On June 18, 2012, EGX became a founding member of the United Nations Sustainable 
Stock Exchanges initiative on the eve of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) 
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Neither the transactions taking place on the stock exchange nor the dividends distributed 
by the listed companies to shareholders are subject to tax. Moreover, there are not any 
restrictions precluding foreign participation in the market. 
The exchange has normal trading sessions from 10:30 am to 2:30 pm, local time, on all 
weekdays, except Fridays, Saturdays, and holidays declared by the exchange in advance. 
(Frequently asked questions: The Egyptian Exchange, 2014), (Wikipedia: The Egyptian 
Exchange, 2014) 
III.2. The Capital market after the Jan. 25th Revolution 
Since January 2011, Egypt has become an unstable country economically and politically. 
The revolution aroused calling for freedom, social justice, and better living conditions has 
negatively affected the economy in various ways. Three years now and the Egyptians 
haven’t reaped any of what they went out calling for. The average standard of living has 
decreased, and unemployment rate, poverty, budget deficit, and debt rate have all 
increased. The political situation in the country has been unclear with many parties 
struggling to govern. The tourism sector – one of the most important revenue generating 
sectors in Egypt – has gone through a stagnation phase due to the instability of the 
security situation. The investment sector has been suffering because the country has lost 
its attractiveness for both domestic and foreign investors due to the uncertainty in almost 
all country aspects. 
The stock market has also fallen, especially during the revolution, and volatility has 
extremely increased which decreased the efficiency of the market. Kamal (2014) reported 
a 16% decrease in the EGX 30 index during the first few days of the revolution before the 
authorities decided to close the market on Jan 28th, 2011 – to prevent further losses. Ezzat 
(2012) also reported another fall of 9% after the reopening of the market on March 22nd 
same year. Ezzat (2012) studied the Egyptian stock market during the political turmoil of 
2011 and found that, during the revolution period, all market indices exhibited high 
standard deviations – implying high volatility of stock returns – where EGX 70 showed 
the highest volatility. Kamal (2014) tested the market for weak form efficiency and was 
specifically concerned with the effect of closing the market for almost two months. First, 
she implied that both market indices, EGX 30 and EGX 100, were sensitive to uncertain 
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conditions. Second, that negative information affected expectations of investors faster 
than positive information did. Third, that closing the stock market has actually negatively 
affected the market. 
Thus, these significant fluctuations of asset prices and market indices in the Egyptian 
exchange make the latter a good candidate for analyzing the existence of herding 
behavior along the empirical lines pursued for other emerging markets. We turn now to 
the relevant empirical literature on herd behavior. The latter is growing considerably, 
indicating the persistent interest in this phenomenon. 
IV. Literature Review on Empirical Herd Behavior 
Herding in financial markets has been regarded by behavioral finance researchers as a behavior 
that could affect financial asset prices and future returns. Thus, papers were written with the aim 
of finding whether herding exists in different stock markets and, if it does, whether it affects the 
market in terms of future returns and volatility.  
The empirical investigation of herd behavior in financial markets is divided into two broad parts 
(Chiang and Zheng, 2010). The first line of research examines co-movement behavior based on 
measures of dynamic correlations among asset prices. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) study three 
financial crises (US stock market crash in 1987, Mexican peso devaluation in 1994, and the 
Asian financial crises in 1997) and analyze the presence of sustainable contagion and 
interdependence of asset prices during these crises. They find no significant evidence of 
contagion during these crises periods. Baur and Fry (2004) find that interdependence is of more 
significance than contagion during the Asian crisis. In contrast, Corsetti et al. (2005) find partial 
evidence of contagion in their study of the Hong Kong stock market crisis in October 1997 to 
both emerging and industrial countries. Billio and Caporin (2010) also find some evidence of 
contagion between the US and the Asian markets. Boyer et al (2006) split emerging market 
stocks into those which are accessible by foreigners and those that are not, and they find larger 
co-movement during high volatility periods in accessible stocks’ returns, thus highlighting the 
role of foreign investors. Chiang et al (2007) detect two phases of the crisis: the first phase is 
characterized by increasing correlation in stock returns, and the second is characterized by 
consistently higher correlation between stock returns. They argue that in the first phase of the 
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crises the main focus of investors is on local country information causing contagion. As the crisis 
becomes widely known, investors’ decisions tend to converge due to herd behavior, which in 
turn raises the degree of correlation.  
The second line of research focuses on the cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns, which is 
taken as a measurement for herd behavior. This is also referred to as market-wide herding 
(Hwang and Salmon, 2004). This line of research was initiated with Christie and Huang (1995), 
who analyzed the US market and argued that herding among investors is more likely during 
periods of market stress. The cross-sectional standard deviation of equity returns is used as a 
measurement for dispersion. A decrease in dispersions during market stress is taken to indicate 
the presence of herding. Bit no evidence of herding was found in the US stock market. Chang et 
al (2000) suggested a similar but less stringent method to detect herding in the market. They use 
the cross-sectional absolute deviation as a measurement for dispersion. Significant evidence of 
herding was found in emerging countries Taiwan and South Korea, partial evidence of herding 
was found in Japan, and no evidence of herding was found in the US and Hong Kong markets. 
Asymmetry of dispersions as a function of the aggregate market return was found across all 
markets, there is less increase in dispersion during down-market days. 
The methodology of Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al (2000) is widely accepted as a 
measurement for herding and several studies have applied their methods or modified versions of 
it (Lindhe, 2012). Indeed, Hwang and Salmon (2004) found that herding exists in the United 
States and South Korea during rising and falling times. However, contrary to common beliefs, 
they found that herding behavior actually decreased during crisis times. Caparrelli, D’Arcangelis, 
and Cassuto (2004) found evidence of adverse herding during stress times in the Italian stock 
market. Caporale, Economou, and Philippas (2008) found that herding exists in Athens stock 
market during stress times. However they found that herding started to get weaker since 2002 
and they attributed this to the Greek equity market institutional and regulatory reforms and 
foreign institutional investors increased market presence. They also found evidence that herding 
is a short lived phenomenon. Tan, Chiang, Mason and Nelling (2008) found, using daily data, 
that herding exists in A and B-shares markets in China but it is more prevalent in A- shares 
market. Zhou and Lai (2009) studied informational cascades in relation to herding behavior in 
Hong Kong and found that; first, investors herd more when the market is low. Second, herding 
occurs in more dominant industries –the financial sector and the property and construction sector 
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in the case of Hong Kong. Third, investors are more likely to herd when selling than when 
buying stocks. And finally, informational cascades do exist in Hong Kong stock market. Cajueiro 
and Tabak (2009) found evidence of herding behavior in Japan stock market during bearish times 
when investors are more likely to herd as proposed by literature. Chiang, Li, and Tan (2010) 
found that herding exists in A-shares market in China during up and down times but found no 
evidence of herding in both states in B-shares market. However, using quantile regression 
analysis – a new method proposed by them – they found evidence of herding behavior in B-
shares market during down times. Chang, Chen, and Jiang (2012) used intraday data to test for 
herding behavior for institutional as well as individual investors in Taiwan stock market and how 
would herding strategies affect their portfolio returns. They found that herding is stronger among 
institutional investors, though individual investors gain more profits through herding than 
institutional investors do. Chen, Yang, and Lin (2012) found that foreign institutional investors 
herd towards stocks in the same industry in Taiwan using daily data. Balsco, Corredor, and 
Ferreruela (2012) investigated the impact of herd behavior on Spain’s stock market volatility. 
They suggested that firms with larger market capitalization and high trading volume during 
down market conditions set the ideal environment for herd behavior to exist. They proposed that 
because high market capitalization firms provide low search costs and are easy to sell, investors 
may prefer to herd on such firms. Concerning volatility and herding, they found that high level of 
herding leads to greater price changes, higher volatility, and sometimes less informative prices. 
Thus, according to the authors, herding has a direct linear impact on volatility, though not 
uniform. Prosad, Kapoor, and Sengupta (2012) concluded that no severe herding has been 
reported in the Indian stock market; however they found that herding exists during bull phases. 
Saumitra (2012) was the first to use the econometric model with threshold effect proposed by 
Hansen (2000) and found little evidence for market herding even during stress times in India.  
More recently, Bhaduri and Mahapatra (2013) found that herding exists in the Indian stock 
market however they stated that certain years happen to be more prone to herding behavior than 
others. Lee, Chen, and Hsieh (2013) used daily data to test for industry herding in China A-
shares market and found evidence for herding behavior. Klein (2013) differentiated between 
turmoil and tranquil trading periods in the United States and Euro area using daily data and 
found that adverse herding exists during periods of turmoil and crisis (This means that investors 
act rationally during crisis times). Ahsan and Sarkar (2013) found no evidence for existence of 
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herding behavior in Bangladesh stock market using daily and monthly data of listed companies 
in Dhaka Stock exchange. Hsieh (2013) used intraday data to test for the existence of 
institutional as well as individual herding behavior in Taiwan stock market and the effects of 
such behavior on stock returns. He found that institutional investors tend to herd more than 
individual investors and they herd more on firms with small market capitalization, however 
herding by individual investors increase during volatile periods. He suggested that herding 
among institutional investors is more likely to be driven by information than by behavior and 
feelings as with individual investors. Yao, Ma, and He (2014) used daily and weekly data to test 
for the existence of herding behavior in China A and B- shares markets during up and down 
times. They found that, first, herding exits in both markets during up and down times, however it 
is more prominent in B-shares market (which contradicts the findings of Tan, Chiang et. al 
(2008) that herding is stronger in A-shares market). Second, herding is strongest among smallest 
and largest stocks but mid trading firms do not exhibit significant herding. Finally, they give 
evidence that herding is a short lived phenomenon and depends on the industry level.  
V. Data 
The study uses daily price data of 73 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock exchange, ranging 
from Jan 2003 till April 2014. We chose this period because it includes various market phases: 
normal phases as well as abnormal ones, such as the 2008 financial crisis, and the pre- and post-
Jan 25th revolution. We also use monthly price data of 86 listed companies from Jan 2000 till 
April 2014 to account for the probability that herding is not a short-lived phenomenon and that it 
might take time to affect the market as suggested by Christie and Huang (1995). We use EGX 30 
index to measure daily and monthly market return for the same periods. All data was extracted 
from Thomson Reuter’s database. For pre-post revolution analysis, we split the sample into two 
equal data sets; the pre-revolution period starts Jan 14th, 2008 and ends Jan 24th, 2011 and the 
post-revolution period starts Mar 23rd, 2011 and ends Apr 15th, 2014. 
VI. Methodology 
The approach taken by the paper is to detect market-wide herding. The latter arises when 
investors in the market ignore the individual characteristics of assets and, instead, follow the 
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performance of the market. The advantage of this particular method is that it is fairly simple 
(Lindhe, 2012). However, the disadvantage is that the method is based on subjective beliefs or 
information guiding the decisions of individual investors following the performance of the 
market as a whole.  
Christie and Huang (1995) suggest that that a suitable measure of the market impact of investor 
herding is dispersion. As it measures the average proximity of individual returns to the market 
return, dispersions are bounded from below zero. When individual returns differ from the market 
return, the level of dispersions increases. Thus, market-wide herding would indicate a decrease in 
dispersions (Lindhe, 2012). Because investors think differently, individual stocks would 
normally vary in their performance and sensitivity to market reactions and thus their returns 
would deviate from overall market return. However, when investors herd around the market, 
stock returns would not exhibit as much deviation; individual stock returns will cluster around 
overall market return. Christie and Huang used the cross-sectional standard deviation as a 
dispersion measure (CSSD). They also proposed that individuals are more likely to follow the 
performance of the market during stressful market conditions (periods of large market 
movements). Accordingly, individual returns will not significantly differ from the market return. 
Thus, the level of dispersions, CSSD, will be lower than during normal market conditions. This 
comes in contrast to rational asset pricing models were dispersions are assumed to increase 
during periods of large market movements.  
Chang et al (2000) extend the work of Christie and Huang (1995) and present a modified and 
less strict method to detect herding behavior in the market as a whole. They assumed (as did 
Christie and Huang) that rational asset pricing models suggest an increase in dispersions during 
stressful periods in the market and that these models would predict a linear relation between 
dispersions in individual assets and the market return (i.e. the dispersions are an increasing 
function of the market return). The authors use CSAD as a measurement of dispersion, which 
they base on the conditional version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They propose that the 
presence of herding behavior in the market would cause the linear relationship to become non-
linear and would decrease the level of dispersions. This means that the dispersions will decrease 
or at least increase at a less-than-proportional rate with the market return (Chiang and Zheng, 
2010). Thus, the method of Chang et al (2000) is better for detecting herding behavior during 
more normal conditions as well as during periods of market stress. 
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More specifically, following Christie and Huang (1995) where they measure dispersion by: 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 =  √
∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁−1
       
 
Where: 
➢ 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 is the Cross Section Standard Deviation of individual stocks’ returns around the 
markets’, 
➢ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is stock i’s  return at time t, 
➢ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average return of the sample at time t, and 
➢ 𝑁 is the number of companies included in the sample 
They propose that herding only occurs in stressful market conditions where people fail to 
rationalize their decisions and find it easier to follow other investors. They define market stress 
or extreme conditions where market returns fall at the tails of their distribution. 
The regression model is 
   𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽
𝑢𝑝𝐷𝑡
𝑢𝑝 +  𝛽𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 +  𝜀𝑡           (1) 
Where: 
➢ 𝛼 denotes the average dispersion of the sample that is not captured by the dummy variables 
➢ 𝐷𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the market index return falls at the 
lower tail at 96% and 99% of the index distribution and zero otherwise (i.e. when  Rindex < - 
2ϭRindex and Rindex < - 3ϭRindex) 
➢ 𝐷𝑡
𝑢𝑝
 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the market index return falls at the 
upper tail at 96% and 99% of the index distribution and zero otherwise (i.e. when  Rindex > 
2ϭRindex and Rindex > 3ϭRindex) 
Hypothesis 
H0:  𝛽𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 < 0 (i.e. herding exists when returns fall at the lower tail of the returns’ 
distribution – down market) 
  𝛽𝑢𝑝 < 0 (i.e. herding exists when returns fall at the upper tail of the returns’ distribution – 
up market) 
H1:  𝛽𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 ≥ 0 (i.e. herding does not exist when returns fall at the lower tail of the returns 
distribution) 
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  𝛽𝑢𝑝 ≥ 0 (i.e. herding does not exist when returns fall at the upper tail of the returns 
distribution) 
If the dummies’ coefficients are negative and statistically significant at 95% confidence interval, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that herding exists at stressful market 
conditions. However, if the coefficients are positive and statistically significant, we reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that adverse herding exists in the market during stressful 
conditions. 
We also follow Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) in order to account for all market states and 
not restrict the model to stressful conditions. Because the CSSD can be sensitive to outliers, they 
measured returns’ dispersion by 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  
∑ |𝑅𝑖,𝑡− 𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁
     
Where: 
➢ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 is the Cross Section Absolute Deviation of individual stocks’ returns around the 
markets’, 
➢ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is stock i’s  return at time t, 
➢ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average return of the sample at time t, and 
➢ 𝑁 is the number of companies included in the sample 
And used the regression model 
 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝐷𝑡
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽𝑢𝑝𝐷𝑡
𝑢𝑝 +  𝜀𝑡        (2) 
Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) argued that herding would increase the correlation of stock 
returns and that the linear relationship proposed by the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) – 
which normally exists between individual stock return and market return – becomes nonlinear 
when herding occurs in the market. We use their modified regression model proposed by Lee, 
Chen, and Hsieh (2013) 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝜆1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜆2|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| +  𝜆3𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 +  𝜀𝑡                    (3) 
Where: 
➢ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the average return of the sample at time t. This term was added by Lee, Chen, and 
Hsieh (2013) to consider asymmetric behavior under different market states, 
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➢ |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| is the absolute market return at time t to account for the magnitude and not the 
direction of the market, and 
➢ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2  captures the nonlinear relationship that would arise due to herding. 
A negative, significant 𝜆3coefficient would indicate the presence of herding behavior. 
Because the relationship between CSAD and market returns can be asymmetric in bull and bear 
markets, they further separated the up mentioned model into the following two equations to 
measure herd behavior in bull and bear markets. 
Bull market 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡
𝑈𝑝 =  𝛼 +  𝛿1
𝑈𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝑝 | + 𝛿2
𝑈𝑝𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑈𝑝 2 + 𝜀𝑡 , if 𝑅𝑚,𝑡> 0         (4) 
Bear market 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 =  𝛼 +  𝛿1
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛| + 𝛿2
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛2 + 𝜀𝑡 , if 𝑅𝑚,𝑡< 0 (5) 
Negative, significant 𝛿2
𝑈𝑝
 coefficient would indicate the presence of herding behavior in bullish 
market and negative, significant 𝛿2
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 coefficient would indicate the presence of herding 
behavior in bearish market. 
VII. Tests for the Model 
Although the model proposed by Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) has strong foundation in 
theory and was used by most previous literature, the model has potential shortcomings due to the 
high level of multicollinearity between the independent variables |𝑅𝑚,𝑡| and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2   and this 
decreases the significance of results (Yao et al., 2014). Thus, we ran the following tests to ensure 
the validity of the model. 
VII.1. Normality 
In order to test for the null hypothesis of normal distribution for all variables with 99% 
confidence interval we calculated the Jarque-Bera test. If the P-value is < 0.01, we reject 
the null hypothesis of “normal distribution” and conclude that the data is not normally 
distributed. Also we use the Kurtosis – a descriptive statistic for fat tails which shows the 
probability for extreme events. When kurtosis is greater than 3, the variable does not 
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follow a normal distribution. From the below tables we see that none of the variables 
used in our regression equations is normally distributed. It is a stylized fact that many 
financial time series do not follow a normal distribution. 
 
Fig. 1 – CSSD Histogram and Statistics 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 CSAD Histogram and Statistics 
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Fig. 3 – EGX 30 Returns Histogram and Statistics 
 
 
Fig. 4 – EGX 30 Absolute Returns Histogram and Statistics 
 
 
Fig. 5 – EGX 30 Squared Returns Histogram and Statistics 
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VII.2. Heteroscedasticity 
As previously mentioned, multicollinearity may be an issue in the model we will use. 
Thus, we have tested the model for the presence of heteroscedasticity using White’s 
General Heteroscedasticity test.  Under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, the 
sample size n times the R2 obtained from the auxiliary regression asymptotically follows 
a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equals to the number of regressors 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Since the pvalue χ2 is < 0.01 we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the model suffers from heteroscedasticity. 
Table 1 – Heteroscedasticity Test Result 
Heteroscedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 3.917950    Prob. F(8,2728) 0.0001 
Obs*R-squared 31.08980    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0001 
Scaled explained SS 116.3974    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0000 
     
     Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 08:32   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.83E-05 3.61E-06 7.840879 0.0000 
EGX30DAILYRETURN -3.41E-05 0.000214 -0.159160 0.8736 
EGX30DAILYRETURN^2 -2.279640 5.239916 -0.435053 0.6636 
EGX30DAILYRETURN*EGX30ABSR
ETURN 0.003541 0.007127 0.496921 0.6193 
EGX30DAILYRETURN*EGX30SQRE
TURN -0.000845 0.043008 -0.019647 0.9843 
EGX30ABSRETURN -0.000540 0.000661 -0.817327 0.4138 
EGX30ABSRETURN*EGX30SQRETU
RN -0.154197 0.420291 -0.366881 0.7137 
EGX30SQRETURN 2.310143 5.240010 0.440866 0.6593 
EGX30SQRETURN^2 0.031689 1.517316 0.020885 0.9833 
     
     R-squared 0.011359    Mean dependent var 2.91E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008460    S.D. dependent var 7.98E-05 
S.E. of regression 7.94E-05    Akaike info criterion -16.03961 
Sum squared resid 1.72E-05    Schwarz criterion -16.02016 
Log likelihood 21959.21    Hannan-Quinn criter. -16.03258 
F-statistic 3.917950    Durbin-Watson stat 1.527137 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000129    
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VII.3. Autocorrelation 
We also test for autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is that there is not serial correlation. 
Since the Durbin-Watson test for first order autocorrelation is 0.6644 which is closer to 0 
for n = 2738 and k = 3, we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 5% level 
and conclude that there is evidence of positive autocorrelation. 
Table 2 – CSAD on Returns Regression Output 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 15:52   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.018272 0.000167 109.6940 0.0000 
EGX30DAILYRETU
RN -0.005275 0.005626 -0.937600 0.3485 
EGX30ABSRETURN 0.194154 0.012854 15.10400 0.0000 
EGX30SQRETURN -0.757249 0.143621 -5.272550 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.113490    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112516    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005399    Akaike info criterion -7.603622 
Sum squared resid 0.079675    Schwarz criterion -7.594978 
Log likelihood 10409.56    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.600499 
F-statistic 116.6247    Durbin-Watson stat 0.664172 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
VII.4. Stationarity 
In order to check whether the independent variables are stationary processes we use the 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test. The null Hypothesis is that the time series are non-stationary 
(i.e. have a unit root). The computed ADF test-statistic was found smaller than the critical 
values for all tested variables at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance. Thus, we reject the hull 
hypothesis and conclude that all variables are stationary (Appendix A). 
VIII. Proposed Modifications 
To correct for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, we re-ran the regressions – for the daily data 
analysis as well as the pre-post revolution analysis – using the modification proposed by Yao et 
al. (2014) on eq. (3) as follows: 
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𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝜆1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜆2|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| +  𝜆3𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜆4(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑚,𝑡)
2  +  𝜆5𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡 (6) 
Where  
➢ ?̅?𝑚,𝑡 is the arithmetic mean of 𝑅𝑚,𝑡, and  
➢ 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 is the 1-day lag of the dependent variable 𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 
These modifications are proposed to remove a large portion of multicollinearity and increase the 
power of the model (Yao et al, 2014). 
IX. Results 
IX.1. The Whole Sample 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
All dependent and independent variables are quantitative, continuous, and measured 
without error since they come from official sources. The descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in our tests are shown in the table below. 
Table 3 – Daily Data Descriptive Statistics 
Daily Data 
CSSD CSAD EGX 30 Returns 
Mean 0.028986395 Mean 0.02050779 Mean 0.001186743 
Standard Error 0.000214251 Standard Error 0.000109553 Standard Error 0.00035089 
Median 0.027127162 Median 0.019811589 Median 0.001655185 
St.Dev 0.011208847 St.Dev 0.00573139 St.Dev 0.018357273 
Sample Var. 0.000125638 Sample Var 3.28488E-05 Sample Var. 0.000336989 
Kurtosis 160.8608784 Kurtosis 4.90492162 Kurtosis 10.2315598 
Skewness 8.484116648 Skewness 1.36087874 Skewness -0.165720288 
Range 0.278104436 Range 0.062224668 Range 0.366305264 
Minimum 0.011743067 Minimum 0.007292083 Minimum -0.164659818 
Maximum 0.289847503 Maximum 0.069516751 Maximum 0.201645446 
Sum 79.33576341 Sum 56.12982001 Sum 3.248115178 
Count 2737 Count 2737 Count 2737 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.000420111 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.000214814 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.000688036 
Where the variables are: CSSD is a time series created using the equally weighted 
cross section standard deviation of stock returns; CSAD is a time series created using 
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the equally weighted cross sectional absolute deviation of stock returns; and EGX 30 
is a time series created using the market value weighted index returns.  The descriptive 
statistics show that all our variables have non-zero variance. 
The number of observations in the sample is 2737. Average EGX 30 daily return for 
the period starting Jan 2003 till April 2014 is 0.1187% with a standard deviation of 
1.8357%. Maximum return for the period is 20% and the minimum return is -16%. 
The returns are negatively skewed with kurtosis of 10.23 indicating that many returns 
fall at the tails of the distribution. 
For the same number of observations, the CSSD has a mean of 2.899% and a standard 
deviation of 1.121%. The CSAD has a mean of 2.051% and a standard deviation of 
0.573%. They are both positively skewed. 
Table 4 – Monthly Data Descriptive Statistics 
Monthly Data 
CSSD CSAD EGX 30 Returns 
Mean 0.13883241 Mean 0.09353682 Mean 0.01572172 
Standard Error 0.00476828 Standard Error 0.00278241 Standard Error 0.00746673 
Median 0.11912374 Median 0.08465134 Median 0.01517083 
St. Dev. 0.06217071 St. Dev. 0.03627816 St. Dev 0.09735428 
Sample Variance 0.0038652 Sample Variance 0.0013161 Sample Variance 0.00947786 
Kurtosis 2.44427366 Kurtosis 0.91453862 Kurtosis 1.16378953 
Skewness 1.43369527 Skewness 1.05899907 Skewness 0.10415198 
Range 0.33903423 Range 0.17977197 Range 0.69794147 
Minimum 0.05000997 Minimum 0.03476031 Minimum -0.33189643 
Maximum 0.38904421 Maximum 0.21453227 Maximum 0.36604504 
Sum 23.6015096 Sum 15.9012597 Sum 2.67269191 
Count 170 Count 170 Count 170 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00941306 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00549275 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.01474008 
The number of observations in the sample is 170. Average EGX 30 monthly return for 
the period starting Jan 2000 till April 2014 is 1.5722% with a standard deviation of 
9.7354%. Maximum return for the period is 36.605% and the minimum return is -
33.1896%. The returns are slightly positively skewed with kurtosis of 1.163. 
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For the same number of observations, the CSSD has a mean of 13.883% and a 
standard deviation of 6.217%. The CSAD has a mean of 9.354% and a standard 
deviation of 3.628%. They are both positively skewed as well. 
b. Regression Results 
1) Daily data 
Using the regression model of Christie and Huang (1995) – eq. (1) –  we find that 
both coefficients – βup and βdown – are positive and statistically significant at 
2ϭRindex and 3ϭRindex up and down, suggesting that weak adverse herding exists in 
extreme market conditions. This contradicts Christie and Huang’s theory that 
markets exhibit herding behavior during stress times. In fact, the results indicate 
that investors actually refrain from following market consensus and act more 
rationally during stressful conditions in the Egyptian stock market. 
Using CSAD instead of CSSD as proposed by Chang et al. (2000) – eq. (2) –  we 
find that both βup and βdown are positive and statistically significant at 2ϭRindex and 
3ϭRindex which supports the previous result that weak adverse herding exists during 
stressful market conditions. 
Using the modified regression model of Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) – eq. 
(3) – we find that 𝜆3 is negative and statistically significant which confirms the 
nonlinear relationship suggested by Chang et al. (2000) to exist in presence of 
herding. We thus conclude that herding behavior exists in the Egyptian stock 
market in general.  
However, the explanatory power of these models is weak and, as earlier 
illustrated; Chang et al.’s model suffers from multicollinearity and autocorrelation 
problems. Using up mentioned model adjusted for autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity – eq. (6) – we find that 𝜆3is statistically insignificant. Thus we 
conclude that herding behavior is not evident in the Egyptian stock market in 
general. The model explanatory power has significantly increased and the 
calculated Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation has increased as well to 1.6. 
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2) Bull and Bear Markets – Daily Data 
Using equation (4) to test for herding behavior existence in bullish market phase, 
we find that 𝛿2
𝑈𝑝
 is statistically insignificant, though negative. Thus, we could not 
conclude that herding behavior exists during bullish market periods. 
Using equation (5) to test for the presence of herding behavior in bearish market 
phase, we find that 𝛿2
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 is positive and statistically insignificant. Thus we 
conclude that herding does not exist during bearish market periods as well. 
3) Monthly data 
Using the regression model of Christie and Huang (1995) – eq. (1) – we find that 
βup is positive and statistically significant but βdown is insignificant, though 
negative, at 2ϭRindex up and down. This means that weak adverse herding exists in 
up market conditions only. However, at 3ϭRindex up and down, both coefficients 
are statistically insignificant suggesting that no herding is evident in stressful 
market conditions. 
Using CSAD instead of CSSD as proposed by Chang et al. (2000) – eq. (2) – we 
find that both βup and βdown are positive at 2ϭRindex and 3ϭRindex. However, only βup 
is statistically significant which supports the previous result that weak adverse 
herding exists during up market conditions only. 
Using the modified regression model of Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) – eq. 
(3) – we find that 𝜆3 is positive and statistically insignificant. This comes in 
agreement with previous literature findings that herding behavior is a short-lived 
phenomenon. 
 
IX.2. Pre- and Post-Revolution 
a) Pre-Revolution Phase 
1) Descriptive statistics 
As illustrated in Table 5 below, the number of observations in the sample is 749. 
Average EGX 30 pre-revolution daily return for the period starting Jan 14th, 2008 
till Jan 24th, 2011 is -0.044% with a standard deviation of 2.059%. Maximum 
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return for the period is 6.5492% and the minimum return is -16.466%. The returns 
are slightly negatively skewed with kurtosis of 6.57. 
For the same number of observations, the CSSD has a mean of 3.291% and a 
standard deviation of 1.0712%. The CSAD has a mean of 2.269% and a standard 
deviation of 0.672%. They are both positively skewed. 
Table 5 –Pre-revolution Data Descriptive Statistics 
Pre-Revolution 
CSSD CSAD EGX30 Returns 
Mean 0.03289957 Mean 0.02269442 Mean -0.00043707 
Standard Error 0.00039141 Standard Error 0.00024538 Standard Error 0.000752492 
Median 0.03136415 Median 0.02182617 Median 0.001069941 
Standard Deviation 0.01071199 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0067156 
Standard 
Deviation 0.020594087 
Sample Variance 0.00011475 
Sample 
Variance 4.5099E-05 
Sample 
Variance 0.000424116 
Kurtosis 4.47038967 Kurtosis 1.49576162 Kurtosis 6.569398935 
Skewness 1.52312233 Skewness 1.01155533 Skewness -1.01227334 
Range 0.0795215 Range 0.03863397 Range 0.230151321 
Minimum 0.0143965 Minimum 0.01065061 Minimum -0.16465982 
Maximum 0.093918 Maximum 0.04928458 Maximum 0.065491503 
Sum 24.6417801 Sum 16.9981208 Sum -0.32736767 
Count 749 Count 749 Count 749 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00076839 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00048172 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.001477247 
 
2) Regression results 
(i) Daily data 
Using the regression model of Christie and Huang (1995) – eq. (1) – we find that 
both coefficients – βup and βdown – are positive and statistically significant at 
2ϭRindex up and down. At 3ϭRindex we find that both coefficients – βup and βdown – 
are positive, however only βdown is significant. Thus, weak adverse herding exists 
in stressful market conditions and persists at the extreme lower tail of the 
distribution but vanishes at the extreme upper one. 
Using CSAD instead of CSSD as proposed by Chang et al. (2000) – eq. (2) – we 
find that both coefficients – βup and βdown – are positive and statistically 
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significant at 2ϭRindex up and down. At 3ϭRindex we find that both coefficients – βup 
and βdown – are positive, however only βdown is significant which supports previous 
result. 
Using the modified regression model of Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) – eq. 
(3) – we find that 𝜆3 is negative and statistically significant which confirms the 
nonlinear relationship suggested by Chang et al. (2000) to exist in presence of 
herding. We thus conclude that herding behavior existed in the Egyptian stock 
market before the revolution. 
However, the explanatory power of these models is weak too and, as previously 
illustrated; eq. (3) suffers from multicollinearity and autocorrelation problems. 
Using eq. (6) – we find that 𝜆3is statistically insignificant. Thus we conclude 
herding behavior was not evident in the Egyptian stock market in general before 
the revolution. The model explanatory power has significantly increased. Also the 
calculated Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation has increased as well to almost 
equal 2 which suggests that this model corrects for autocorrelation. 
(ii) Bull and Bear markets 
Using equation (4) to test for herding behavior existence in bullish market phase, 
we find that 𝛿2
𝑈𝑝
 is positive and statistically significant indicating adverse herd 
behavior in bullish market states. Using equation (5) to test for the presence of 
herding behavior in bearish market phase, we find that 𝛿2
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 is statistically 
insignificant, though negative. Thus, we found no evidence of herd behavior in 
bearish market states. 
 
b) Post-Revolution Phase 
1) Descriptive statistics 
As illustrated in Table 6 below, the number of observations in the sample is 749. 
Average EGX 30 post-revolution daily return for the period starting Mar 23rd, 2011 
and ending Apr 15th, 2014 is 0.0602% with a standard deviation of 1.626%. Maximum 
35 
 
return for the period is 7.588% and the minimum return is -9.588%. The returns are 
slightly negatively skewed with kurtosis of 4.46. 
For the same number of observations, the CSSD has a mean of 2.381% and a standard 
deviation of 0.662%. The CSAD has a mean of 1.6999% and a standard deviation of 
0.501%. They are both positively skewed. 
We would like to note that the average equally weighted market portfolio return has 
actually increased after the revolution, and that the market volatility has decreased. A 
reason that we propose is that investors, alarmed by the unstable conditions in the 
country, act slower to information and systematically analyze the market before 
making entry or exit decisions after the revolution, which decreases the volatility of 
market return and positively affect the market in general. 
Table 6 – Post-revolution Data Descriptive Statistics 
Post-Revolution 
CSSD CSAD EGX30 Returns 
Mean 0.02380671 Mean 0.01699297 Mean 0.000602234 
Standard Error 0.00024188 Standard Error 0.00018299 Standard Error 0.000594063 
Median 0.02260442 Median 0.01610669 Median 0.001228652 
St. Dev. 0.00661966 St. Dev. 0.00500799 St. Dev. 0.016258235 
Sample 
Variance 4.382E-05 
Sample 
Variance 2.508E-05 
Sample 
Variance 0.00026433 
Kurtosis 6.12424093 Kurtosis 7.02408532 Kurtosis 4.460073121 
Skewness 1.79037584 Skewness 1.92357588 Skewness -0.31213362 
Range 0.05245139 Range 0.04053819 Range 0.171772228 
Minimum 0.01174307 Minimum 0.00729208 Minimum -0.09588751 
Maximum 0.06419445 Maximum 0.04783027 Maximum 0.075884714 
Sum 17.831228 Sum 12.7277359 Sum 0.451072973 
Count 749 Count 749 Count 749 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00047484 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.00035923 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.001166229 
 
2) Regression results 
(i) Daily Data 
Using the regression model of Christie and Huang (1995) – eq. (1) –  we find that 
both coefficients – βup and βdown – are positive and statistically significant at 
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2ϭRindex and 3ϭRindex up and down, suggesting that weak adverse herding exists in 
extreme market conditions.  
Using CSAD instead of CSSD as proposed by Chang et al. (2000) – eq. (2) –  we 
find that both βup and βdown are positive and statistically significant at 2ϭRindex and 
3ϭRindex which supports previous result that weak adverse herding exists during 
stressful conditions. 
Using the modified regression model of Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000) – eq. 
(3) – we find that 𝜆3 is positive and statistically significant. We thus conclude that 
adverse herding behavior exists in the post-revolution Egyptian stock market. 
The explanatory power of these models is weak too, as with previous tests and, as 
previously illustrated; eq. (3) suffers from multicollinearity and autocorrelation 
problems. Using eq. (6) – we find that 𝜆3is statistically insignificant. Thus we 
conclude herding behavior is not evident in the Egyptian stock market in general 
after the revolution. The model explanatory power has significantly increased. 
The calculated Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation has increased as well to 
almost equal 2 which suggests that this model corrects for autocorrelation. 
(ii) Bull and Bear markets 
Using equation (4) to test for herding behavior existence in bullish market phase, we find 
that 𝛿2
𝑈𝑝
 is positive and statistically significant indicating adverse herd behavior in 
bullish market states. 
 Using equation (5) to test for the presence of herding behavior in bearish market phase, 
we find that 𝛿2
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 is positive and statistically significant indicating adverse herd 
behavior in bearish market states as well. 
 
IX.3. A Note on the Results 
We find these results extremely interesting and surprising because, first, we expected that 
herding behavior would be evident during stressful conditions – as proposed by previous 
literature – but at the contrary; we found that adverse herding exists in the market suggesting 
that investors actually act rationally during stressful market times. This could be reasoned by 
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the fact that when investors panic, sometimes they might actually become more precautious 
and analytical in their decisions and thus, they would not follow the market and count on their 
personal views. This could be the case in Egypt, especially where most investors assume the 
low financial education levels of other investors and the inefficiency of the market in general. 
Thus, investors would actually refrain from following the market which they believe 
inefficient and accordingly, they might actually exhibit adverse herd behavior as evident by 
the results. 
Second, we rationally expected that herding behavior would exist in the Egyptian stock market 
after the revolution due to the high uncertainty levels and economic and political disturbance 
in the country. However, we found that, in fact, adverse herding existed in all market states – 
in general, during stressful times, and in bullish and bearish market phases – though herding 
behavior has existed before the revolution in the market in general. The reasons we propose 
for this behavior are that, first, after the revolution more people became aware of current 
events and the various risks present in the market and accordingly, a rational investor would 
analyze the market and make an informed decision regardless of the market trend. Second, 
investors may have become even more precautious and less adventurous due to the economic 
and political situation of the country. Finally, low financially educated and irrational investors 
who were likely to herd previously might have actually exited the market after the revolution 
in the fear of drastic falls of the market. 
Thus, these results indicate that, against the general beliefs; investors in the Egyptian stock 
market are rational under stressful conditions; and, the 25th Jan revolution has positively 
affected the rationality of investors in the Egyptian stock market in all states. 
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X. Conclusion 
This paper tests for the presence of herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market. Using daily 
and monthly data of listed companies on the Egyptian stock market, we used different models to 
test for herding in the market at different circumstances and during various periods. Specifically, 
we used Christie and Huang (1995) model to test for herding in stressful conditions, the modified 
Chang et al. (2000) model to test for herding behavior in general, and their expanded tests to 
measure herding behavior during bullish and bearish market phases. We also tested for the 
validity of Chang et al. general model and corrected for multicollinearity and autocorrelation 
using the model proposed by Yao et al. (2014). 
Through daily data analysis, we found evidence of weak adverse herding in extreme market 
conditions and evidence of herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market in general. Analyzing 
monthly data, we found that weak adverse herding exists in the up market conditions only, 
however it vanishes at the extreme tails of the distribution. We could not find an evidence for 
herding behavior in the market in general which means that herding behavior is a short-lived 
phenomenon. We also found no evidence of herding behavior in neither bearish nor bullish 
market phases in the Egyptian stock market. Splitting the sample we found that during the pre-
revolution period, herding behavior existed in general and adverse herding existed during 
stressful conditions as well as during bullish market phases; however, we found no evidence of 
herding behavior during bearish market phases in this period. During post-revolution period, we 
found that adverse herding existed in general, during stressful conditions, and also during bullish 
and bearish market phases. 
When we corrected for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, we found no evidence of herd 
behavior in the Egyptian stock market in general and neither did we in the pre-post revolution 
analysis. 
This paper contributes to literature in three ways. First, this is the first paper that discusses 
herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market and tests for it. Second, this is also the first to 
consider for the Jan 25th revolution effects on herding behavior. Finally, we used various models 
to test for herding behavior in the Egyptian stock market, tested the general model of Chang et 
al. – which is still being used by different researchers around the world for herding behavior tests 
– and corrected for its pitfalls using an integration of modifications. 
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Appendix A – Stationarity Test Results 
 
Table A.1 – CSSD Unit Root test 
 
Null Hypothesis: UNIT_ROOT_CSSD has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -34.22683  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.432548  
 5% level  -2.862397  
 10% level  -2.567271  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(UNIT_ROOT_CSSR)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 12:15   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2737   
Included observations: 2736 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     UNIT_ROOT_CSSD(
-1) -0.599883 0.017527 -34.22683 0.0000 
C 0.017390 0.000545 31.92479 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.299957    Mean dependent var 5.38E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.299701    S.D. dependent var 0.012279 
S.E. of regression 0.010275    Akaike info criterion -6.317436 
Sum squared resid 0.288655    Schwarz criterion -6.313113 
Log likelihood 8644.253    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.315874 
F-statistic 1171.476    Durbin-Watson stat 2.232726 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A.2 – CSAD Unit Root test 
Null Hypothesis: CSAD has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -19.25880  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.432548  
 5% level  -2.862397  
 10% level  -2.567271  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CSAD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 08:45   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2737   
Included observations: 2736 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CSAD(-1) -0.238968 0.012408 -19.25880 0.0000 
C 0.004901 0.000264 18.54676 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.119457    Mean dependent var -4.22E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.119135    S.D. dependent var 0.003963 
S.E. of regression 0.003719    Akaike info criterion -8.349780 
Sum squared resid 0.037822    Schwarz criterion -8.345457 
Log likelihood 11424.50    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.348218 
F-statistic 370.9015    Durbin-Watson stat 2.552463 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A.3 – EGX Returns Unit Root test 
 
Null Hypothesis: EGX30DAILYRETURN has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -44.18234  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.432548  
 5% level  -2.862397  
 10% level  -2.567271  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EGX30DAILYRETURN)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 09:54   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2737   
Included observations: 2736 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EGX30DAILYRETUR
N(-1) -0.833012 0.018854 -44.18234 0.0000 
C 0.000983 0.000347 2.833956 0.0046 
     
     R-squared 0.416570    Mean dependent var -3.71E-06 
Adjusted R-squared 0.416356    S.D. dependent var 0.023697 
S.E. of regression 0.018103    Akaike info criterion -5.184709 
Sum squared resid 0.896017    Schwarz criterion -5.180386 
Log likelihood 7094.683    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.183147 
F-statistic 1952.079    Durbin-Watson stat 1.998524 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table A.4 – EGX Absolute Returns Unit Root test 
 
Null Hypothesis: EGX30ABSRETURN has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -38.29712  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.432548  
 5% level  -2.862397  
 10% level  -2.567271  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EGX30ABSRETURN)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 09:56   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2737   
Included observations: 2736 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EGX30ABSRETURN
(-1) -0.698304 0.018234 -38.29712 0.0000 
C 0.008983 0.000335 26.78232 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.349151    Mean dependent var -3.71E-06 
Adjusted R-squared 0.348913    S.D. dependent var 0.015536 
S.E. of regression 0.012536    Akaike info criterion -5.919739 
Sum squared resid 0.429632    Schwarz criterion -5.915415 
Log likelihood 8100.203    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.918176 
F-statistic 1466.669    Durbin-Watson stat 2.083412 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A.5 – EGX30 Square Returns Unit Root test 
 
Null Hypothesis: EGX30SQRETURN has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -37.56093  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.432548  
 5% level  -2.862397  
 10% level  -2.567271  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EGX30SQRETURN)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 09:57   
Sample (adjusted): 2 2737   
Included observations: 2736 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EGX30SQRETURN(-
1) -0.680774 0.018125 -37.56093 0.0000 
C 0.000230 2.22E-05 10.38105 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.340382    Mean dependent var -9.50E-08 
Adjusted R-squared 0.340141    S.D. dependent var 0.001373 
S.E. of regression 0.001115    Akaike info criterion -10.75924 
Sum squared resid 0.003399    Schwarz criterion -10.75492 
Log likelihood 14720.65    Hannan-Quinn criter. -10.75768 
F-statistic 1410.823    Durbin-Watson stat 2.010790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix B – Regression Results 
 
Daily Data 
1. 𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷
𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜷𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 +  𝜺𝒕  
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSSD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 15:49   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.028576 0.000217 131.8336 0.0000 
UP95 0.008077 0.001433 5.636555 0.0000 
DOWN95 0.008888 0.001331 6.678960 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.026551    Mean dependent var 0.028986 
Adjusted R-squared 0.025839    S.D. dependent var 0.011209 
S.E. of regression 0.011063    Akaike info criterion -6.169309 
Sum squared resid 0.334620    Schwarz criterion -6.162826 
Log likelihood 8445.700    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.166967 
F-statistic 37.28470    Durbin-Watson stat 1.268612 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSSD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 15:49   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.028826 0.000214 134.5227 0.0000 
UP99 0.009000 0.002632 3.419023 0.0006 
DOWN99 0.013198 0.002438 5.412934 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.014678    Mean dependent var 0.028986 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013957    S.D. dependent var 0.011209 
S.E. of regression 0.011130    Akaike info criterion -6.157186 
Sum squared resid 0.338701    Schwarz criterion -6.150704 
Log likelihood 8429.110    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.154844 
F-statistic 20.36342    Durbin-Watson stat 1.231737 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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2. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 +  𝜷
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 + 𝜷𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜺𝒕   
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/04/14   Time: 21:10   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.020187 0.000109 185.5507 0.0000 
UP95 0.006413 0.000719 8.917070 0.0000 
DOWN95 0.006870 0.000668 10.28637 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.062065    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.061379    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005553    Akaike info criterion -7.547965 
Sum squared resid 0.084296    Schwarz criterion -7.541482 
Log likelihood 10332.39    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.545622 
F-statistic 90.45670    Durbin-Watson stat 0.585457 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
At 3ϭ 
 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/04/14   Time: 21:11   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.020396 0.000109 187.3094 0.0000 
UP99 0.006900 0.001338 5.159017 0.0000 
DOWN99 0.008716 0.001239 7.034894 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.026904    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026192    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005656    Akaike info criterion -7.511163 
Sum squared resid 0.087456    Schwarz criterion -7.504680 
Log likelihood 10282.03    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.508821 
F-statistic 37.79488    Durbin-Watson stat 0.522512 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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3. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝝀𝟏𝑹𝒎,𝒕 +  𝝀𝟐|𝑹𝒎,𝒕| +  𝝀𝟑𝑹𝒎,𝒕
𝟐 +  𝜺𝒕  
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 15:52   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.018272 0.000167 109.6940 0.0000 
EGX30DAILYRETU
RN -0.005275 0.005626 -0.937600 0.3485 
EGX30ABSRETURN 0.194154 0.012854 15.10400 0.0000 
EGX30SQRETURN -0.757249 0.143621 -5.272550 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.113490    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112516    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005399    Akaike info criterion -7.603622 
Sum squared resid 0.079675    Schwarz criterion -7.594978 
Log likelihood 10409.56    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.600499 
F-statistic 116.6247    Durbin-Watson stat 0.664172 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
4. Modified CSAD on returns 
 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 13:52   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.115219 0.068662 1.678075 0.0934 
EGX30DAILYRETU
RN -11.64491 7.715600 -1.509269 0.1313 
EGX30ABSRETURN 0.141835 0.011138 12.73443 0.0000 
EGX30SQRETURN 326.6791 216.7530 1.507149 0.1319 
RM_RAV2 -327.1673 216.7521 -1.509408 0.1313 
CSADT_1 0.251121 0.007980 31.46875 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.349726    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.348536    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.004626    Akaike info criterion -7.912060 
Sum squared resid 0.058443    Schwarz criterion -7.899094 
Log likelihood 10833.65    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.907375 
F-statistic 293.7539    Durbin-Watson stat 1.656933 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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5. Bull Market 
 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 11:09   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.019825 0.000134 148.4976 0.0000 
EGX30_UP_ABS 0.105239 0.013763 7.646558 0.0000 
EGX30_UP_SQ -0.325722 0.169854 -1.917656 0.0553 
     
     R-squared 0.029622    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028912    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005648    Akaike info criterion -7.513960 
Sum squared resid 0.087212    Schwarz criterion -7.507478 
Log likelihood 10285.85    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.511618 
F-statistic 41.72975    Durbin-Watson stat 0.513155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
6. Bear Market 
 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 11:11   
Sample: 1 2737    
Included observations: 2737   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.019965 0.000126 158.8046 0.0000 
EGX30_DOWN_ABS 0.081549 0.015740 5.181161 0.0000 
EGX30_DOWN_SQ 0.401857 0.227650 1.765245 0.0776 
     
     R-squared 0.043943    Mean dependent var 0.020508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043243    S.D. dependent var 0.005731 
S.E. of regression 0.005606    Akaike info criterion -7.528828 
Sum squared resid 0.085925    Schwarz criterion -7.522345 
Log likelihood 10306.20    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.526485 
F-statistic 62.83074    Durbin-Watson stat 0.559125 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Monthly Data 
1. 𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷
𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜷𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 +  𝜺𝒕  
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSSD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 16:08   
Sample: 1 170    
Included observations: 170   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.136758 0.004768 28.68195 0.0000 
UP95 0.088454 0.030901 2.862530 0.0047 
DOWN95 -0.000554 0.043439 -0.012750 0.9898 
     
     R-squared 0.046792    Mean dependent var 0.138832 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035376    S.D. dependent var 0.062171 
S.E. of regression 0.061061    Akaike info criterion -2.736393 
Sum squared resid 0.622653    Schwarz criterion -2.681055 
Log likelihood 235.5934    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.713938 
F-statistic 4.098914    Durbin-Watson stat 1.075044 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.018288    
     
      
 
At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSSD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 16:09   
Sample: 1 170    
Included observations: 170   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.138057 0.004782 28.86856 0.0000 
UP99 0.104583 0.062169 1.682236 0.0944 
DOWN99 0.027272 0.062169 0.438674 0.6615 
     
     R-squared 0.017726    Mean dependent var 0.138832 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005963    S.D. dependent var 0.062171 
S.E. of regression 0.061985    Akaike info criterion -2.706356 
Sum squared resid 0.641639    Schwarz criterion -2.651019 
Log likelihood 233.0403    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.683901 
F-statistic 1.506862    Durbin-Watson stat 1.070620 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.224602    
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2. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 +  𝜷
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 + 𝜷𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜺𝒕   
 
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 14:58   
Sample: 1 170    
Included observations: 170   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.091972 0.002762 33.30370 0.0000 
UP95 0.057780 0.017897 3.228427 0.0015 
DOWN95 0.017421 0.025160 0.692409 0.4896 
     
     R-squared 0.060899    Mean dependent var 0.093537 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049652    S.D. dependent var 0.036278 
S.E. of regression 0.035366    Akaike info criterion -3.828639 
Sum squared resid 0.208877    Schwarz criterion -3.773301 
Log likelihood 328.4343    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.806184 
F-statistic 5.414778    Durbin-Watson stat 0.926391 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005266    
     
      
At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/09/14   Time: 15:00   
Sample: 1 170    
Included observations: 170   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.092847 0.002766 33.56460 0.0000 
UP99 0.080365 0.035961 2.234793 0.0268 
DOWN99 0.036874 0.035961 1.025383 0.3067 
     
     R-squared 0.034787    Mean dependent var 0.093537 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023228    S.D. dependent var 0.036278 
S.E. of regression 0.035854    Akaike info criterion -3.801214 
Sum squared resid 0.214684    Schwarz criterion -3.745876 
Log likelihood 326.1032    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.778758 
F-statistic 3.009402    Durbin-Watson stat 0.897857 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.052004    
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3. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝝀𝟏𝑹𝒎,𝒕 +  𝝀𝟐|𝑹𝒎,𝒕| +  𝝀𝟑𝑹𝒎,𝒕
𝟐 +  𝜺𝒕  
 
Dependent Variable: CSAD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/14   Time: 16:10   
Sample: 1 170    
Included observations: 170   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.085736 0.005351 16.02266 0.0000 
EGX30RETURN 0.042961 0.028454 1.509860 0.1330 
EGX30ABSRETURN 0.049358 0.101252 0.487479 0.6266 
EGX30SQRETURN 0.351056 0.374745 0.936788 0.3502 
     
     R-squared 0.087213    Mean dependent var 0.093537 
Adjusted R-squared 0.070717    S.D. dependent var 0.036278 
S.E. of regression 0.034972    Akaike info criterion -3.845296 
Sum squared resid 0.203024    Schwarz criterion -3.771512 
Log likelihood 330.8501    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.815355 
F-statistic 5.286888    Durbin-Watson stat 0.874625 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001659    
     
 
 
Pre-revolution 
 
1. 𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷
𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜷𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 +  𝜺𝒕  
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSSD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 05:55   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.032215 0.000390 82.63052 0.0000 
PREREV_UP96 0.012762 0.002619 4.872835 0.0000 
PREREV_DOWN96 0.011419 0.002031 5.621244 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.067292    Mean dependent var 0.032900 
Adjusted R-squared 0.064792    S.D. dependent var 0.010712 
S.E. of regression 0.010359    Akaike info criterion -6.297895 
Sum squared resid 0.080055    Schwarz criterion -6.279395 
Log likelihood 2361.562    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.290766 
F-statistic 26.91083    Durbin-Watson stat 0.794043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSSD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:00   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.032696 0.000387 84.53269 0.0000 
PREREV_UP99 0.009030 0.007455 1.211197 0.2262 
PREREV_DOWN99 0.022353 0.004316 5.179464 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.036470    Mean dependent var 0.032900 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033886    S.D. dependent var 0.010712 
S.E. of regression 0.010529    Akaike info criterion -6.265383 
Sum squared resid 0.082700    Schwarz criterion -6.246884 
Log likelihood 2349.386    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.258254 
F-statistic 14.11806    Durbin-Watson stat 0.688988 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
     
     
2. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 +  𝜷
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 + 𝜷𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜺𝒕   
 
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 05:59   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.022203 0.000242 91.93547 0.0000 
PREREV_UP96 0.009850 0.001622 6.071563 0.0000 
PREREV_DOWN96 0.007808 0.001258 6.204833 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.089434    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086993    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.006417    Akaike info criterion -7.255781 
Sum squared resid 0.030717    Schwarz criterion -7.237281 
Log likelihood 2720.290    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.248652 
F-statistic 36.63547    Durbin-Watson stat 0.493731 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:00   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.022585 0.000244 92.65128 0.0000 
PREREV_UP99 0.005921 0.004698 1.260249 0.2080 
PREREV_DOWN99 0.011746 0.002720 4.318508 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.026348    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023738    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.006635    Akaike info criterion -7.188793 
Sum squared resid 0.032845    Schwarz criterion -7.170293 
Log likelihood 2695.203    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.181664 
F-statistic 10.09378    Durbin-Watson stat 0.369535 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000047    
     
      
 
3. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝝀𝟏𝑹𝒎,𝒕 +  𝝀𝟐|𝑹𝒎,𝒕| +  𝝀𝟑𝑹𝒎,𝒕
𝟐 +  𝜺𝒕  
 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:02   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.019204 0.000366 52.44577 0.0000 
EGX30_R 0.020384 0.011524 1.768796 0.0773 
EGX30_RABS 0.264815 0.026930 9.833443 0.0000 
EGX30_RSQ -0.867239 0.326130 -2.659184 0.0080 
     
     R-squared 0.195203    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.191962    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.006037    Akaike info criterion -7.376586 
Sum squared resid 0.027149    Schwarz criterion -7.351920 
Log likelihood 2766.532    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.367081 
F-statistic 60.23292    Durbin-Watson stat 0.679593 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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4. Modified CSAD on returns 
 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 13:46   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004260 0.000473 9.007512 0.0000 
EGX30_R 0.568967 0.292870 1.942729 0.0524 
EGX30_RABS 0.085841 0.016789 5.112927 0.0000 
EGX30_RSQ 643.7580 334.9926 1.921708 0.0550 
_R_RAV__2 -643.9107 334.9888 -1.922186 0.0550 
CSADT_1 0.766451 0.020907 36.65944 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.714408    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.712486    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.003601    Akaike info criterion -8.407273 
Sum squared resid 0.009634    Schwarz criterion -8.370274 
Log likelihood 3154.524    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.393015 
F-statistic 371.7232    Durbin-Watson stat 2.475766 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
5. Bull Market 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:10   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.022068 0.000303 72.89602 0.0000 
EGX30_UPR_ABS -0.029727 0.049776 -0.597204 0.5506 
EGX30_UPR_SQ 4.891375 1.176218 4.158562 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.087640    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085194    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.006423    Akaike info criterion -7.253813 
Sum squared resid 0.030778    Schwarz criterion -7.235313 
Log likelihood 2719.553    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.246684 
F-statistic 35.83006    Durbin-Watson stat 0.477903 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6. Bear Market 
Dependent Variable: PREREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:12   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.021825 0.000284 76.76599 0.0000 
EGX30_DOWNR_A
BS 0.117512 0.028368 4.142382 0.0000 
EGX30_DOWNR_SQ -0.055184 0.334054 -0.165195 0.8688 
     
     R-squared 0.056358    Mean dependent var 0.022694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.053828    S.D. dependent var 0.006716 
S.E. of regression 0.006532    Akaike info criterion -7.220100 
Sum squared resid 0.031833    Schwarz criterion -7.201600 
Log likelihood 2706.927    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.212971 
F-statistic 22.27698    Durbin-Watson stat 0.441009 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Post-revolution 
 
1. 𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷
𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜷𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 +  𝜺𝒕  
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSSD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:22   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.023252 0.000230 101.3038 0.0000 
POSTREV_UP96 0.015015 0.001598 9.396566 0.0000 
POSTERV_DOWN96 0.008641 0.001326 6.517535 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.146264    Mean dependent var 0.023807 
Adjusted R-squared 0.143976    S.D. dependent var 0.006620 
S.E. of regression 0.006125    Akaike info criterion -7.349006 
Sum squared resid 0.027983    Schwarz criterion -7.330507 
Log likelihood 2755.203    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.341877 
F-statistic 63.90340    Durbin-Watson stat 0.769870 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSSD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:27   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.023506 0.000224 104.7704 0.0000 
POSTREV_UP99 0.021991 0.002316 9.494850 0.0000 
POSTREV_DOWN99 0.023882 0.003528 6.768621 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.153408    Mean dependent var 0.023807 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151138    S.D. dependent var 0.006620 
S.E. of regression 0.006099    Akaike info criterion -7.357409 
Sum squared resid 0.027749    Schwarz criterion -7.338909 
Log likelihood 2758.350    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.350280 
F-statistic 67.58992    Durbin-Watson stat 0.715688 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
2. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜶 +  𝜷
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏𝑫𝒕
𝒅𝒐𝒘𝒏 + 𝜷𝒖𝒑𝑫𝒕
𝒖𝒑
+  𝜺𝒕   
 
At 2ϭ 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:27   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.016510 0.000169 97.54416 0.0000 
POSTREV_UP96 0.012466 0.001178 10.57920 0.0000 
POSTERV_DOWN96 0.007940 0.000978 8.121079 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.188871    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.186696    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.004516    Akaike info criterion -7.958222 
Sum squared resid 0.015217    Schwarz criterion -7.939723 
Log likelihood 2983.354    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.951093 
F-statistic 86.85286    Durbin-Watson stat 0.800274 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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At 3ϭ 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:29   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.016753 0.000168 99.85263 0.0000 
POSTREV_UP99 0.016641 0.001732 9.608160 0.0000 
POSTREV_DOWN99 0.021188 0.002639 8.030233 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.172818    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.170600    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.004561    Akaike info criterion -7.938624 
Sum squared resid 0.015518    Schwarz criterion -7.920125 
Log likelihood 2976.015    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.931495 
F-statistic 77.92841    Durbin-Watson stat 0.702281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
3. 𝑪𝑺𝑨𝑫𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝝀𝟏𝑹𝒎,𝒕 +  𝝀𝟐|𝑹𝒎,𝒕| +  𝝀𝟑𝑹𝒎,𝒕
𝟐 +  𝜺𝒕  
 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:30   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.014854 0.000276 53.73762 0.0000 
POSTREV_EGX30_R 0.017772 0.009630 1.845411 0.0654 
POSTREV_EGX30_R
ABS 0.145601 0.028482 5.112067 0.0000 
POSTREV_EGX30_R
SQ 1.628575 0.485085 3.357298 0.0008 
     
     R-squared 0.279625    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.276724    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.004259    Akaike info criterion -8.074207 
Sum squared resid 0.013514    Schwarz criterion -8.049541 
Log likelihood 3027.791    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.064702 
F-statistic 96.39461    Durbin-Watson stat 0.894302 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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4. Modified CSAD on Returns Model 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/14   Time: 13:37   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.005273 0.000411 12.83989 0.0000 
POSTREV_EGX30_R -0.083943 0.316049 -0.265601 0.7906 
POSTREV_EGX30_R
ABS 0.049293 0.020185 2.442085 0.0148 
POSTREV_EGX30_R
SQ 74.02133 262.6075 0.281871 0.7781 
_R_RAV__2 -71.43820 262.6216 -0.272019 0.7857 
CSADT_1 0.617991 0.022101 27.96252 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.650353    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.648000    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.002971    Akaike info criterion -8.791715 
Sum squared resid 0.006559    Schwarz criterion -8.754715 
Log likelihood 3298.497    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.777457 
F-statistic 276.4001    Durbin-Watson stat 2.431327 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
5. Bull Market 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:32   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.016476 0.000217 75.95176 0.0000 
POSTREV_EGX30_UP_R
ABS -0.012013 0.033946 -0.353895 0.7235 
POSTREV_EGX30_UP_RS
Q 4.538678 0.740614 6.128268 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.144526    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142232    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.004638    Akaike info criterion -7.904993 
Sum squared resid 0.016048    Schwarz criterion -7.886493 
Log likelihood 2963.420    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.897864 
F-statistic 63.01534    Durbin-Watson stat 0.647947 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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6. Bear Market 
Dependent Variable: POSTREV_CSAD  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/13/14   Time: 06:33   
Sample: 1 749    
Included observations: 749   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.016525 0.000208 79.42598 0.0000 
POSTREV_EGX30_DOWN_R
ABS 0.022730 0.030976 0.733792 0.4633 
POSTREV_EGX30_DOWN_R
SQ 2.551420 0.590459 4.321078 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.097315    Mean dependent var 0.016993 
Adjusted R-squared 0.094895    S.D. dependent var 0.005008 
S.E. of regression 0.004764    Akaike info criterion -7.851275 
Sum squared resid 0.016934    Schwarz criterion -7.832776 
Log likelihood 2943.303    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.844147 
F-statistic 40.21157    Durbin-Watson stat 0.675707 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
